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What is Equality? The Winding 
Course of Judicial Interpretation 
Peter W. Hogg* 
I. PURPOSE OF PAPER 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) 
came into force on April 17, 1982. However, the coming into force of 
section 15 of the Charter was postponed for three years to provide time 
for each government to review its body of legislation and make amend-
ments to bring the laws into conformity with equality. Section 15 there-
fore came into force in 1985, which makes April 17, 2005 its 20th 
anniversary. The purpose of this paper is to describe the 20-year history 
of section 15 in the Supreme Court of Canada.  
A related guarantee of equality is section 28 of the Charter, which 
provides that the rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter “are 
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.” This provision (which 
has a counterpart in section 35(4), the aboriginal-rights guarantee) has 
rarely been referred to in the cases. Even in the case of gender equality, 
the courts have assumed that all the work is done by section 15. 
Another related guarantee is section 27, which provides that the 
Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” This 
has also rarely been referred to, and has never played an important role 
in a decision. 
II. THE “EMPTY IDEA” OF EQUALITY 
A guarantee of equality cannot mean that laws must treat everyone 
equally. No law does that. The Criminal Code imposes punishments on 
those convicted of crime; no similar burden is imposed on the innocent. 
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Education Acts require children to attend school; no similar obligation is 
placed on adults. Persons over 65 are entitled to public pensions; per-
sons under 65 are not. Manufacturers of food and drugs are subject to 
more stringent regulation than manufacturers of automobile parts. Every 
law employs classifications of one kind or another for the imposition of 
burdens or the grant of benefits. Obviously, only those classifications 
that are unfair in some way would violate a guarantee of equality. But 
which are they?  
The straightforward definition of equality, based on Aristotle’s ac-
count, is that like persons should be treated alike, and unlike persons 
should be treated differently in proportion to the difference between 
them. The fundamental difficulty with this account is not that it is wrong 
(as is often claimed) but that it is stated at too high a level of generality 
to be useful. It provides no criteria to determine when a person is “like” 
another, or even who should be compared to whom, and it provides no 
criteria to assess the appropriateness of different treatments of those 
who are not alike. Furthermore, the criteria cannot really be found in the 
idea of equality by itself. The question of who should be punished by 
the criminal law and what the appropriate punishment should be is a 
question of criminal justice. Similarly, questions about the fairness of 
entitlements or obligations to public education, public pensions, regula-
tory oversight, and so on, are difficult issues of public policy that are not 
going to be answered by an abstract notion of equality. This has led 
commentators to describe equality as an “empty idea”.1 It is empty in the 
sense that it cannot be applied without first working out the criteria of 
likeness and like treatment, and the idea of equality cannot by itself 
supply those criteria. 
The most common criticism of the Aristotelian idea of equality is 
not that it is empty, but that it can mask discrimination that occurs indi-
rectly rather than directly. An apparently neutral law may have a dispro-
portionate effect on a particular group, which will claim that it has been 
treated unequally. A law that prohibits women from serving in the po-
lice forces would directly discriminate against women. A law framed in 
gender-neutral language that prohibits persons under six feet in height 
from serving in the police forces would have the indirect effect of dis-
criminating against women, because their generally lower height will 
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cause them, disproportionately, to fail to meet the recruitment standard. 
Everyone agrees that a theory of equality must cover the indirect as well 
as the direct case.  
It has never been clear to me that the Aristotelian idea of equality 
was incapable of recognizing the indirect case. After all, the claim of the 
equality-seeking group is that unlike cases are being treated alike by the 
apparently neutral law. In any event, the conventional wisdom is that 
“formal equality” (which is what is attributed to Aristotle) is “trivial, 
even insulting”,2 because it does not capture indirect discrimination. 
Robert Wintemute, writing about discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation, challenges the conventional wisdom. He points out that 
“formal legal equality has tremendous material and symbolic value, 
which only those who have been denied it for many years can fully 
appreciate.”3 But, as Wintemute acknowledges, formal equality is not 
enough. It is also necessary to guarantee “substantive equality”, mean-
ing by that term a theory of equality that will capture indirect as well as 
direct discrimination. Even when one moves from formal equality (pro-
hibiting direct discrimination) to substantive equality (prohibiting indi-
rect as well as direct discrimination),4 one is still left with the problem 
that the idea of equality does not by itself supply the criteria for deter-
mining which distinctions (whether they be direct or indirect) are con-
sistent with the idea of equality and which are not.      
In the paper that follows, I trace the “winding course” of judicial in-
terpretation of section 15.5 The Supreme Court of Canada has changed 
the ground rules every few years as the judges have journeyed along that 
winding course. It has been a serious problem for any commentator 
foolish enough to try and keep a treatise on constitutional law up to date. 
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But it is well to remember the emptiness of the idea that section 15 
constitutionalizes. It is not easy to apply a guarantee of equality. 
III. EQUALITY BEFORE THE CHARTER  
When section 15 came into force, Canadian courts were not entirely 
unprepared to apply a guarantee of equality. The Canadian Bill of 
Rights, which was a statutory bill of rights, and which applied only to 
federal laws, contained a guarantee of “equality before the law”. In R. v. 
Drybones (1969),6 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
the Indian Act offence of being intoxicated off a reserve, because it 
applied only to “Indians”, was invalid for conflict with the equality 
guarantee of the Bill. In later cases, however, the Court decided that, if a 
federal law pursued a “valid federal objective”, then its provisions could 
not be attacked on equality grounds. This highly deferential approach 
left Drybones as the only example of a conflict with the equality guaran-
tee of the Bill.7 These cases were generally regarded as unsophisticated 
and unduly deferential to Parliament, and did not provide good models 
for a new jurisprudence under a constitutional bill of rights. Moreover, 
much of the phraseology of section 15 (accounting for its verbose lan-
guage) was specifically designed to negate various poorly considered 
rulings under the Bill.8  
The other body of law of which Canadian courts were aware (at 
least dimly) was the jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the American Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
adopted after the Civil War and the emancipation of the slaves, included 
a guarantee of the “equal protection of the laws”. The American courts 
had developed a doctrine of reasonable classification, under which a law 
that drew a distinction that was reasonable in light of a legitimate pur-
pose satisfied the guarantee. The Supreme Court of the United States 
normally struck down racial classifications under this doctrine, Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954)9 being the most famous example. But the 
doctrine of reasonable classification was far from clear, and the “strict 
scrutiny” that the Court applied to racial classifications was moderated 
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for other classifications, yielding a jurisprudence that did not give equal 
protection very much work to do.10 As well, the history of slavery in the 
United States culminating in the Civil War, and the persistence after 
emancipation of official discrimination against African Americans, 
provided a unique context for the Fourteenth Amendment. 
IV. EQUALITY BEFORE ANDREWS 
As related above, the Charter of Rights was adopted in 1982, and it 
included section 15, although that particular guarantee did not come into 
force until 1985. Section 15 provides:    
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has 
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity 
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged 
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because 
of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
The four different ways of describing equality (“equal before”, “equal 
under”, “equal protection” and “equal benefit”) in section 15 are ex-
plained by earlier decisions under the Canadian Bill of Rights. In prac-
tice, nothing has turned on these various formulations, and they will not 
be pursued in this paper. Nor has section 15(2) been given any inde-
pendent force, since it has consistently been treated as a clarification of 
the guarantee of substantive equality in section 15(1).11 
What is actually prohibited by section 15 is “discrimination” and, 
“in particular” discrimination “based on” the listed grounds of “race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability”. The words “in particular” made clear that the listed grounds 
were not exhaustive. Did that mean that every legislative classification 
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was potentially reviewable under section 15? At first, Canadian courts 
answered “yes”, and Canadian lawyers rose to the challenge. Every law 
could be attacked under section 15! The volume of cases was truly dis-
turbing. A study prepared in 1988,12 only three years after the coming 
into force of section 15, found 591 judicial decisions (two-thirds of 
which were reported in full) in which a law had been challenged under 
section 15. Most of the challenges seemed unmeritorious, and most of 
the challenges were unsuccessful. But the absence of any clear standards 
for the application of section 15 encouraged lawyers to keep trying to 
use section 15 whenever a statutory distinction worked to the disad-
vantage of a client.  
On the assumption that section 15 could potentially cover all legis-
lative classifications, how did one determine which classifications were 
in breach of the Charter? A variety of theories were proposed by courts 
and commentators to answer that question. At one extreme, was the 
theory, espoused by me in the second edition of my text,13 that every 
distinction drawn in a statute counted as discrimination in breach of 
section 15. The question whether it was justified or not would then have 
to be determined under section 1. On this theory, the structure of analy-
sis developed in R. v. Oakes (1986)14 for justification under section 1 
(sufficiently important objective, rational connection to that objective, 
minimum impairment and proportionality) would be the analysis that 
would be applied to all section 15 challenges. The analogy was freedom 
of expression, which is guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter; the 
Supreme Court has defined “expression” so broadly that freedom of 
expression cases are in practice all decided under section 1. 
At the other end of the spectrum was the position taken by 
McLachlin J. (now the Chief Justice of Canada) when she was a judge 
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In the Andrews case (1986),15 
which eventually went on to the Supreme Court of Canada, she held that 
the only legislative distinctions that would amount to discrimination 
were those that were “unreasonable or unfair”. On this theory, section 
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15 contained its own implicit requirement of justification, and the ques-
tion whether a legislative distinction was justified or not would be de-
termined by an assessment of its reasonableness or unfairness according 
to standards that the courts would have to develop within section 15 
itself. Presumably, section 1 would play no role in section 15 cases since 
section 1 justifies only “reasonable” limits on Charter rights. The analo-
gy was “unreasonable search and seizure”, which is prohibited by sec-
tion 8 of the Charter; the justificatory principle for search and seizure 
provisions is embedded in section 8 itself. 
V. THE REQUIREMENT OF LISTED OR ANALOGOUS GROUNDS 
It was the theory that section 15 covered all legislative classifica-
tions that opened the floodgates to equality challenges. Whether justifi-
cation was to be found in section 1 or within section 15 itself was not 
likely to make much difference to the volume of cases coming before 
the courts. What was needed was some threshold barrier that would 
reduce the flow of cases to those where legislative distinctions were 
presumptively suspect, and where judicial intervention was less likely to 
disturb legitimate legislative line-drawing. In fact, section 15 did con-
tain some clues to its scope that were missing from its counterparts in 
the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. The listed 
grounds, although admittedly not exhaustive, did point to personal char-
acteristics of individuals that cannot easily be changed and which have 
often been the target of prejudice or stereotyping. The reference in sub-
section (2) (the affirmative action clause) to “disadvantaged individuals 
or groups” suggested that the role of section 15 was to correct discrimi-
nation against disadvantaged individuals or groups. These features of 
section 15 suggested that the proper role of section 15 was not to elimi-
nate all unfairness from our laws, let alone all classifications that could 
not be rationally defended, but rather to eliminate discrimination based 
on immutable personal characteristics. 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989)16 was the first 
section 15 case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada. It was a chal-
lenge to the statutory requirement of the province of British Columbia 
that members of the bar had to be citizens of Canada. The Court held 
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unanimously that this requirement was contrary to section 15, and by a 
majority that it was not saved by section 1. Justice McIntyre wrote for 
the unanimous Court on the interpretation of section 15 (although he 
ended up dissenting, because he thought the law should be upheld under 
section 1). Justice McIntyre discussed and rejected the theories ad-
vanced by me (that section 15 condemned all legislative classifications) 
and by McLachlin J. (that section 15 condemned unreasonable or unfair 
classifications). He held that there was a “middle ground” between those 
two positions, which was to interpret “discrimination” in section 15 as 
applying to only the grounds listed in section 15 and “analogous” 
grounds. This “enumerated and analogous grounds approach”, he said, 
“most closely accords with the purposes of s. 15”, and “leaves questions 
of justification to s. 1”.17 The Court went on to hold (with surprisingly 
little discussion) that citizenship qualified as an analogous ground of 
discrimination. 
After Andrews, it was clear that section 15 was a prohibition of dis-
crimination, and that discrimination was the imposition of a disad-
vantage (the imposition of a burden or the denial of a benefit)18 on an 
individual by reason of the individual’s possession of a characteristic 
listed in section 15 or analogous to those listed in section 15. This im-
mediately ruled out judicial review of all statutes that did not employ a 
listed or analogous classification. This was a severe reduction in the 
scope of section 15, but one that could certainly be supported by the text 
of the section. After Andrews, only L’Heureux-Dubé J., for a time, re-
fused to accept the new doctrine. She advocated a more discretionary, 
case-by-case, assessment of whether discrimination existed.19 No other 
judge agreed with her, and she rejoined the other members of the Court 
in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1999),20 
in which the Court unanimously reaffirmed the restriction of section 15 
to listed and analogous grounds. The Court in Law also added a new 
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restriction, namely, that discrimination involved an impairment of “hu-
man dignity”. That element of section 15 is discussed later in this arti-
cle. For present purposes, I simply note that the restriction to listed and 
analogous grounds has persisted to the present day and is obviously a 
permanent feature of the section 15 exegesis. 
VI. THE ADDITION OF ANALOGOUS GROUNDS 
Although the restriction to listed and analogous grounds was a se-
vere reduction in the scope of section 15, it did leave room for analo-
gous grounds to be enrolled as bases for findings of discrimination. 
What are “analogous” grounds? Obviously, they are grounds that are 
similar in some important way to the grounds listed in section 15, which 
are “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability”. These are all personal characteristics of individ-
uals that are unchangeable (or immutable), or at least unchangeable by 
the individual except with great difficulty or cost. What is objectionable 
about using such characteristics as legislative distinctions is that conse-
quences should normally follow what people do rather than what they 
are. It is not normally acceptable to impose a disadvantage on a person 
by reason of a characteristic that is outside the person’s control. The 
function of section 15 is to provide for judicial review of legislative 
distinctions of that kind.  
In Andrews itself, although the Court was unanimous that citizen-
ship was an analogous ground, only La Forest J. attempted to grapple 
with a definition. He pointed out that citizenship was a personal charac-
teristic that is “typically not within the control of the individual and, in 
this sense, is immutable.”21 This ruling was affirmed in Lavoie v. Cana-
da (2002),22 where the issue was the validity of a statutory hiring prefer-
ence for citizens in the federal public service. A majority of the Court, 
which divided on issues of human dignity and section 1, upheld the 
preference, but all members of the Court agreed that citizenship was an 
analogous ground. 
The second analogous ground to be recognized was marital status. 
The recognition started in Miron v. Trudel (1995), which concerned the 
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statutory provision of accident benefits to a “spouse”, which was de-
fined as a person legally married to the victim. Although the claimant 
common-law spouse succeeded in striking down the requirement of 
legal marriage, only four judges actually held that marital status was an 
analogous ground. Four judges held that it was not. The fifth member of 
the majority (L’Heureux Dubé J.) held that it did not matter.23 This was 
less than a ringing endorsement of marital status as an analogous 
ground, but, in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh (2002),24 the 
Court (which included two of the judges who had dissented in Miron v. 
Trudel) was unanimous that marital status was an analogous ground. 
However, the majority of the Court held that the matrimonial property 
regime of Nova Scotia, which was restricted to persons legally married, 
did not breach section 15, because it did not impair the human dignity of 
the common-law spouses despite their exclusion by reason of their mari-
tal status. 
It is worth interpolating here that neither citizenship nor marital sta-
tus has a strong claim to be an analogous ground, because neither is 
immutable in any strong sense. Each is a status that can often be chosen 
by the individual, although (as the Court has rightly emphasized) that 
choice is sometimes blocked by legal requirements or (in the case of 
marital status) by the contrary wish of another person. Indeed, the ele-
ment of choice has been important in persuading the Court to uphold 
legislative distinctions based on citizenship25 and marital status.26 It is 
not surprising to find the requirement of dignity or the requirements of 
section 1 defeating constitutional challenges based on either of these 
analogous grounds.   
The third analogous ground to be recognized was sexual orienta-
tion. In Egan v. Canada (1995),27 eight of nine judges decided that sexu-
al orientation was an analogous ground. Justice La Forest, writing for 
himself and three others, described sexual orientation as “a deeply per-
sonal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at 
unacceptable personal costs.”28 For complicated reasons, the claimants, a 
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same-sex couple who were seeking a spousal allowance under the feder-
al Old Age Security program, did not actually succeed. But the ruling on 
analogous grounds was clear enough, and it paved the way for a series 
of cases that confirmed the ruling and upheld the equality rights of ho-
mosexual claimants. In Vriend v. Alberta (1998),29 the Court held that 
Alberta’s human rights code violated section 15 by failing to include 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination. In M. v. H. 
(1999),30 the Court held that Ontario’s family law legislation violated 
section 15 by excluding same-sex couples from spousal support obliga-
tions. In Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of 
Justice) (2000),31 the Court held that the practices of customs officials in 
obstructing the importation of books by a bookstore catering to gay and 
lesbian communities was a breach of section 15. The Courts of Appeal 
of British Columbia and Ontario and other provincial courts have held 
that the opposite-sex requirement for marriage is contrary to section 15, 
thereby legalizing same-sex marriage in several provinces.32  These 
decisions also helped the Supreme Court to decide that the federal pow-
er over “marriage” extended to same-sex marriage,33 a ruling which was 
followed by legislation enacting a new national definition of marriage 
that no longer requires the couple to be of opposite sex.34 
So far, these three grounds are the only ones that have been recog-
nized. Place of residence has not been accepted as an analogous 
ground,35 except in the special case of residence on an Indian reserve.36 
Nor is occupation an analogous ground, so that a law denying collective 
bargaining rights to police officers cannot be challenged under section 
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15.37 And privileges for the Crown in litigation cannot be challenged, 
because there is no distinction based on an analogous ground.38 
Where there is no distinction based on an analogous ground, there is 
no remedy under section 15. The Court, which of course created this 
restriction, has chafed against it in some cases where the Court wanted 
to grant a remedy. Malapportioned voting districts, which give rural 
votes more weight than urban votes, have been held to be unconstitu-
tional under the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter.39 This decision 
allows place of residence to be a ground of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion where voting rights are involved. The exclusion of agricultural 
workers from Ontario’s labour relations legislation has been held to be 
unconstitutional under the right to freedom of association in section 2(d) 
of the Charter.40 This decision allows occupation to be a ground of un-
constitutional discrimination where freedom of association is involved. 
When the Court imports equality values into other Charter rights,41 it 
leaves out the restriction to listed and analogous grounds! (And it also 
leaves out the requirement of an impairment of human dignity.) 
VII. RECOGNITION OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
Justice McIntyre in Andrews made clear that section 15 required 
substantive and not merely formal equality. He rejected the “similarly 
situated” test, which was the way in which formal equality had been 
expressed in the past, pointing out that “identical treatment may fre-
quently produce serious inequality.”42 He acknowledged that equality is 
a “comparative concept”, and the key to its application under section 15 
was the prohibition of “discrimination”. He referred to cases under the 
human rights codes and to the Abella report on equality in employment 
to conclude that indirect (or systemic) inequality was covered along 
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with direct inequality.43 Substantive equality—meaning that indirect as 
well as direct discrimination was prohibited—has been a central as-
sumption of the interpretation of section 15 to the present day. 
The recognition of substantive equality has enormous symbolic sig-
nificance for equality-seeking groups, such as women or visible minori-
ties, who have generally achieved formal equality. It allows a court to 
drill beneath the surface of the facially neutral law and identify adverse 
effects on a class of persons distinguished by a listed or analogous per-
sonal characteristic. It is not necessary to show that the law was passed 
with the intention of discriminating; the mere fact that the law does have 
the disproportionately adverse effect is enough. Despite the commitment 
of the Supreme Court of Canada to substantive equality, and despite the 
industry of women’s groups and other equality-seeking groups in devel-
oping equality cases for litigation, only two claims of indirect discrimi-
nation have been successful.44 One is Eldridge v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) (1997),45 where the challenge was to the failure of 
British Columbia’s statutory health care plan to provide publicly-funded 
sign-language interpretation to deaf persons seeking medical services. 
British Columbia’s law was neutral in that all persons were denied sign-
language interpretation, but of course the denial only disadvantaged deaf 
people. The Court held that the law discriminated against deaf people in 
breach of section 15. The other is Vriend v. Alberta (1998),46 where the 
challenge was to the failure of Alberta’s human rights legislation to 
include sexual orientation in the list of forbidden grounds of discrimina-
tion in employment. Alberta’s law was neutral in that the denial of a 
remedy applied equally to those of heterosexual orientation47 as well as 
to those of homosexual orientation. However, the disproportionate im-
pact of the law was so obvious that the Court held that it discriminated 
against those of homosexual orientation in breach of section 15.   
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 Unsuccessful claims of indirect discrimination are Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attor-
ney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (prohibition on assisted suicide not dis-
crimination on the basis of physical disability); Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 
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discrimination on the basis of sex). Each of these cases divided the Court. However, the total 
number of indirect discrimination claims reaching the Court is surprisingly small. 
45
 [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. 
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 Supra, note 29. 
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 Discrimination on the ground of heterosexuality is rare, but not unknown, for example, in 
the “gay kitchen” of a restaurant. 
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VIII. THE AMBIGUITY IN ANDREWS’ DEFINITION OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
My reading of Andrews was that a breach of section 15 occurred 
whenever a disadvantage (a burden or withheld benefit) was imposed on 
the basis of a listed or analogous ground. That finding would exhaust 
the role of section 15, and issues of the reasonableness or fairness of the 
challenged law would be addressed under section 1. This elegant and 
simple approach accorded appropriately distinct roles for section 15 and 
section 1 in the equality inquiry. And who could doubt that the Oakes 
principles of justification, so carefully developed to determine justifica-
tion for breaches of all the other guarantees of the Charter, were just as 
suitable to determine whether a classification based on a listed or analo-
gous ground should be upheld? 
This reading of Andrews meant that “discrimination” in section 15 
had a very simple meaning. It meant the imposition of a disadvantage or 
withholding of a benefit on the basis of a listed or analogous ground. 
However, when I go back to Andrews to try and understand why this 
understanding has not persisted in the later cases, I find that there is a 
passage in McIntyre J.’s opinion that introduces a serious element of 
uncertainty as to what he actually meant. After restricting the operation 
of section 15 to listed and analogous grounds, he says that:48  
However, in assessing whether a complainant’s rights have been 
infringed under s. 15(1), it is not enough to focus only on the alleged 
ground of discrimination and decide whether or not it is an enumerated 
or analogous ground. The effect of the impugned distinction or 
classification on the complainant must be considered. Once it is 
accepted that not all distinctions and differentiations created by law 
are discriminatory, then a role must be assigned to s. 15(1) which goes 
beyond the mere recognition of a legal distinction. A complainant 
under s. 15(1) must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal 
treatment before and under the law or that the law has a differential 
impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law but, 
in addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is 
discriminatory.  
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This difficult passage certainly leaves the impression that something 
more than the breach of a listed or analogous ground is required to con-
stitute discrimination under section 15. But it is accompanied by no hint 
as to what that something more might be, other than the vague sugges-
tion that it has to do with the “effect” or “impact” of the law. 
The passage that I have quoted is then followed by McIntyre J.’s 
ruling as to the relationship between section 15 and section 1:49 
Where discrimination is found a breach of s. 15(1) has occurred and—
where s. 15(2) is not applicable—any justification, any consideration 
of the reasonableness of the enactment; indeed any consideration of 
factors that could justify the discrimination and support the 
constitutionality of the impugned enactment would take place under 
s. 1. 
This passage makes clear that considerations of reasonableness or other 
justificatory factors would be addressed under section 1. The implica-
tion is that such matters are not part of the definition of discrimination 
in section 15, because, if they are, the clear demarcation between the 
roles of section 15 and section 1 is destroyed. 
My only point in picking away at McIntyre J.’s opinion in Andrews 
is to show that there is some ambiguity and uncertainty as to whether he 
intended his “enumerated and analogous grounds” approach to exhaust 
the elements of “discrimination” in section 15. If discrimination is taken 
to include other elements, then the meaning of section 15 becomes quite 
unclear, and the respective roles of section 15 and section 1 become 
confused. If, on the other hand, discrimination is taken to mean simply a 
breach of a listed or analogous ground, then the meaning of section 15 is 
clear, and the respective roles of section 15 and section 1 are also clear. 
In the subsequent cases, these two views warred for supremacy, and 
unfortunately the wrong side won. 
In the Miron and Egan cases, decided in 1995, four of the nine 
judges wanted to import into the section 15 analysis (through the defini-
tion of discrimination) the requirement that the legislative classification 
not only be based on a listed or analogous ground, but also be “irrele-
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vant” to “the functional values of the legislation.”50 If the legislative 
classification was relevant, then there was no discrimination. If there 
was no discrimination, there was no breach of section 15, and no re-
quirement for the government to justify under section 1 its use of a 
listed or analogous ground as the basis for the imposition of a disad-
vantage. One can readily agree that the relevance of a legislative distinc-
tion to a legitimate legislative purpose is important in assessing whether 
the distinction is justified or not. But an inquiry into relevance would 
essentially duplicate the Oakes tests for section 1 justification.51 Of the 
five other judges in Miron and Egan, four followed the orthodox route 
of ignoring the ambiguity in Andrews. They held that a disadvantage 
imposed on the basis of an analogous ground (marital status in Miron, 
sexual orientation in Egan) was enough to constitute discrimination, and 
immediately moved on to section 1 justification. One judge, L’Heureux-
Dubé J., took a different path entirely, rejecting the restriction of section 
15 to listed and analogous grounds, and investigating discrimination on 
a broader, more discretionary, case-by-case basis. 
After Miron and Egan, which were decided in 1995, the Court was 
splintered into three camps as to the interpretation of section 15. This 
did not stop them from deciding some section 15 cases unanimously. In 
Eaton,52 Benner,53 Eldridge54 and Vriend,55 decided between 1996 and 
1998, the Court reached unanimous decisions,56 but made no attempt to 
resolve the differences among the judges. It was not necessary, they 
claimed,57 because in each case all three interpretations of section 15 
would have led to the same result.  
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 Supra, note 19, at para. 15 per Gonthier J. dissenting (with the agreement of Lamer 
C.J.C., La Forest and Major JJ.); supra, at para. 13 per La Forest J. concurring (with the agreement 
of Lamer C.J., Gonthier and Major JJ.).  
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 In Miron v. Trudel, id., at paras. 31-38, Gonthier J. argues that the requirement of irrele-
vance in s. 15 would still leave s. 1 with some work to do. The argument depends on the point that 
the “functional values” of the legislation are not the same as the objective of the legislation. This is 
a highly refined distinction. 
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 Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, 
paras. 62-65. 
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 Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] S.C.J. No. 26, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at 
paras. 60-68. 
54
 Supra, note 45, at paras. 58-59. 
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 Supra, note 26, at paras. 70-74. 
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IX. THE REQUIREMENT OF AN IMPAIRMENT OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
In Law v. Canada (1999),58 the Supreme Court of Canada surprised 
observers by issuing a unanimous opinion, written by Iacobucci J., that 
provided a new interpretation of section 15. The new interpretation 
differed from each of the three of the competing interpretations that had 
been offered in Miron and Egan. The new consensus was as follows:  
(1)  Section 15 applied only to legislative distinctions based on a listed 
or analogous ground (contrary to L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s earlier 
view). 
(2)  Discrimination in section 15 involved an element additional to a 
distinction based on a listed or analogous ground (contrary to four 
judges’ earlier view). 
(3)  That additional element was an impairment of “human dignity”59 
(contrary to all nine judges’ earlier view). 
The new requirement of an impairment of human dignity defeated 
the claimant in Law. Under the federal Canada Pension Plan, survivors’ 
benefits were payable to the spouses of deceased contributors, unless the 
spouse was under the age of 35, in which case the spouse was not enti-
tled to survivors’ benefits. The claimant in Law was the survivor of a 
deceased contributor, but, because she was under the age of 35, she was 
ineligible for a survivor’s benefit. The law withheld a benefit from her 
on the ground of her age, age being a listed ground under section 15. On 
the simple interpretation of Andrews, that should have sent the issue on 
to section 1, where the government would be required to satisfy the 
Court that the age-based distinction was justified under the standards 
established in Oakes. But, by adding the new requirement of human 
dignity to section 15, the Court imposed on the claimant the burden of 
establishing that the age-based distinction was an impairment of her 
human dignity. She was unable to discharge that burden, and so her 
equality claim was denied without recourse to section 1.  
Why was the age-based distinction in Law not an impairment of 
human dignity? The Court’s answer was that, in the context of the Can-
ada Pension Plan’s purpose, it recognized the reality that young widows 
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and widowers would have less difficulty than older persons in finding 
and maintaining employment after the death of a spouse, and would in 
the long term be able to replace the lost income of the deceased spouse. 
This is very close to saying that the age-based distinction was a reason-
able restriction on access to CPP benefits. And yet, if one point was 
clearly enunciated by McIntyre J. in Andrews, it was that, once discrim-
ination was found under section 15, issues of reasonableness should be 
left to section 1.60 This ruling would be nonsensical if only unreasonable 
distinctions qualified as discrimination under section 15. 
Justice Iacobucci in Law did not define “human dignity”. What he 
did do was to suggest61 four “contextual factors” (which were not to be 
taken as exhaustive) that were helpful to the inquiry. The factors were: 
(1) the existence of pre-existing disadvantage; (2) any correspondence 
between the distinction and the claimant’s characteristics or circum-
stances; (3) the existence of ameliorative purposes or effects on other 
groups; and (4) the nature of the interest affected. In Law itself, it was 
the second (“correspondence”) factor that was important. The age quali-
fication for CPP survivor benefits corresponded to the actual character-
istics and circumstances of youthful surviving spouses, who could more 
readily find or maintain employment than older surviving spouses. 
Since 1999, every case has followed the Law analysis, and looked 
for an impairment of human dignity. Law has supplanted Andrews as the 
leading case on section 15. This is unfortunate. The element of human 
dignity that is now apparently firmly embedded in the jurisprudence is 
vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants.62  
Human dignity is vague. In the cases following Law, the Court has 
often disagreed with lower courts and disagreed among itself on the 
question whether the challenged law impairs the human dignity of the 
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claimant.63 As Debra McAllister has concluded (after a careful analysis 
of the opinions on human dignity), the disagreements cannot be said to 
be simply “a case of reasonable people disagreeing on the application of 
a legal test”; rather, the disagreements show that the test has “very little 
substance”.64 Considering that the validity of legislation turns on the 
application of the test, this is a very serious criticism. 
Human dignity is confusing. As an element of section 15, it is a re-
version to the idea that was rejected in Andrews, namely, that section 15 
should be restricted to unreasonable or unfair distinctions. As McIntyre 
J. pointed out in Andrews, by introducing this kind of evaluative step 
into section 15, the relationship between section 15 and section 1 is 
confused, and it is not clear how much work section 1 is left to do.   
Human dignity is burdensome to claimants. Any increase in the el-
ements of section 15 has the undesirable effect of increasing the burden 
on the claimant. The claimant must establish all elements of section 15. 
This means that a failure to establish an impairment of human dignity is 
fatal to the claimant’s case, which never advances to section 1. The 
government must establish all elements of section 1. This means that, if 
a disadvantage on a listed or analogous ground were enough to consti-
tute discrimination under section 15, it would be for the government to 
establish an important objective to the challenged law and proportional 
means of carrying out the objective. This burden is not unreasonable, 
since government is in a much better position than the claimant to ad-
duce the necessary evidence. But the burden is removed from govern-
ment if the claimant fails to persuade the Court of an impairment of 
human dignity. Moreover, the inquiry into human dignity is highly un-
structured compared with the section 1 inquiry. In particular, the court 
does not need to make a finding of minimum impairment (or least dras-
tic means), which under section 1 calls for an inquiry as to whether there 
are alternative legislative measures that would accomplish the legisla-
tive purpose without impairing the right as much.  
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In Law, the Court frankly acknowledged that it was imposing a new 
burden on the claimant, and could only offer in reply65 that in some 
cases it would not be necessary for the claimant “to adduce evidence”, 
because it would be “evident on the basis of judicial notice and logical 
reasoning” that human dignity had been impaired. The fact remains that 
a failure to persuade the Court (in one fashion or another) that human 
dignity is impaired causes the claimant to lose the case. As well as Law 
itself, in many subsequent equality cases, the claimant has established a 
disadvantage based on a listed or analogous ground, but has lost the case 
for failure to also establish an impairment of human dignity.66  
X. THE REQUIREMENT OF CORRESPONDENCE 
As I explained in the previous s. of this article, in Law the Court 
suggested four “contextual factors” that were to be taken into account in 
determining whether or not human dignity is impaired by a law that 
imposes a disadvantage on the basis of a listed or analogous ground. 
The factor that was dispositive in that case was correspondence between 
the challenged legislative distinction and the characteristics or circum-
stances of the claimant. The denial of CPP survivor benefits to spouses 
under the age of 35 accurately corresponded to the circumstances of 
younger spouses of deceased income-earners, who could be expected to 
be more successful in finding and retaining employment than older 
spouses. Therefore, the claimant, who was denied the spousal benefit on 
the basis of her age, was unable to establish an impairment of her human 
dignity and therefore lost her case. 
Another age-based case was Gosselin v. Quebec (2002),67 where a 
workfare program that provided low welfare benefits for persons under 
30 unless they attended training programs was upheld. According to the 
majority, the age-based requirement corresponded to the increased ca-
pability of young persons to benefit from training programs. According 
to the minority, the imposition of hardship on young persons did not 
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respect them as full persons. The majority prevailed, of course, and the 
claimant, who had subsisted with great difficulty on the low benefits 
because she had been unable to access the training programs, was una-
ble to establish an impairment of her human dignity and therefore lost 
her case.  
In Nova Scotia v. Walsh (2002),68 the exclusion of common-law 
spouses from Nova Scotia’s community property regime was held, by a 
divided Court, to correspond to real differences between common-law 
relationships and legal marriages. In Canadian Foundation for Children, 
Youth and the Law v. Canada (2004),69 the Criminal Code’s permission 
for parents and teachers to use reasonable corrective force against chil-
dren was held by a divided Court to correspond to the needs of children. 
On the other hand, in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. 
Martin (2003),70 the Court held unanimously that Nova Scotia’s provi-
sion of short-term remedial programs, instead of full workers’ compen-
sation benefits, for “chronic pain” did not correspond to the needs of 
injured workers who suffered from that condition. 
The correspondence factor has become the key to the impairment of 
human dignity. From the cases so far, it appears to be the decisive factor 
in determining whether there is an impairment of human dignity.71 It is 
the answer to that factor that yields the outcome, even if the other fac-
tors point in the other direction. What are we to make of this? On the 
one hand, perhaps we should welcome a somewhat more specific test as 
the proxy for human dignity—although the judges are usually divided 
on the correspondence test. On the other hand, what does the corre-
spondence factor really mean? Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, I sug-
gest that the correspondence test, as it has been applied by the Court, 
comes down to an assessment by the Court of the legitimacy of the 
statutory purpose and the reasonableness of using a listed or analogous 
ground to accomplish that purpose.72 If I am right, this leaves very little 
work for section 1 to do.   
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XI. THE ROLE OF SECTION 1 IN EQUALITY CASES 
Since Law imported human dignity into section 15 in 1999, there 
has been one case in which section 1 has saved a law found to be in 
breach of section 15.73 In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E. 
(2004),74 the Court decided that Newfoundland, faced with a serious 
financial crisis, could enact a law postponing the implementation of 
collective agreements under which the government had undertaken to 
increase the wages of female hospital workers in order to achieve pay 
equity with men. The Court held that the law withheld a benefit on the 
basis of a listed ground, namely, sex. The Court also held that it was a 
breach of human dignity to maintain in force wages that did not do jus-
tice to the female workers’ contribution. Therefore, there was a breach 
of section 15. But the Court accepted that in 1991, when the law was 
enacted, the province had experienced a huge reduction in federal trans-
fer payments, causing the province to make comparable cuts in expendi-
tures, which it did by temporarily freezing the wages of all public sector 
employees, laying off many employees and not filling vacant positions, 
closing hospital beds, reducing medicare coverage, and freezing or re-
ducing expenditures for education and other government programs. As 
part of the response to this fiscal crisis, the postponement of Charter-
mandated expenditures was justified under section 1.75 
The N.A.P.E. case is an unusual one. In the great majority of cases, 
the new element of human dignity in section 15 leaves no role for sec-
tion 1. It is obviously hard to justify a law that imposes a disadvantage 
on the basis of a listed or analogous ground and also impairs human 
dignity.76 If I am right that human dignity depends on the “correspond-
ence” factor, and if I am right that that the Court uses this factor to de-
cide whether the purpose of the law is legitimate and the use of a listed 
or analogous ground to accomplish the purpose is reasonable, the close 
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overlap between human dignity and section 1 becomes obvious. Not 
surprisingly, with the exception of the N.A.P.E. case, section 1 has be-
come unimportant in equality cases since the human dignity element 
was introduced by the Court in 1999. As explained earlier in the article 
(perhaps ad nauseum), the claimant often loses for failure to establish an 
impairment of human dignity. Perhaps the same cases would be lost 
under section 1 too. But at least section 1 is the subject of carefully 
structured legal tests, and the burden of proving each step of the way 
rests on government not the claimant.  
At a rhetorical level, there is something insulting about telling the 
unsuccessful equality claimant in a case like Law or Gosselin or Walsh 
that her human dignity has not been impaired. This is a person who has 
been disadvantaged by a legislative distinction based on her age or mari-
tal status (or some other listed or analogous ground), and who is so 
upset by her treatment that she has gone to court to challenge the law. 
Obviously, many equality-seeking claimants are going to lose their 
cases, and obviously they will be unhappy, but the judicial rhetoric 
about human dignity makes it look as though they were silly or even 
neurotic to bother the courts with their problem. Would it not be more 
compassionate to explain that a disadvantage imposed on the basis of a 
listed or analogous ground is indeed discrimination in violation of sec-
tion 15, but this particular law must be upheld because government was 
able to prove that the law pursued an important purpose, and did so by 
proportionate means? If we must talk about dignity, I say that is a much 
more dignified way to lose than to be told that the law from which you 
suffered never impaired your human dignity. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The winding course of judicial interpretation may continue to wind. 
For all the reasons provided in this paper, I hope it winds away from 
Law and back to Andrews. However, all present indications are that Law 
is here to stay, along with its much-maligned requirement of an impair-
ment of human dignity. 
The current state of the law on section 15 is that a claimant must 
show “discrimination”, which has the following ingredients: 
(1)  The challenged law imposes (directly or indirectly) on the 
claimant a disadvantage (in the form of a burden or withheld 
benefit) in comparison to other comparable persons;  
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(2)  The disadvantage is based on a ground listed in or analogous to a 
ground listed in section 15; 
(3)  The disadvantage also constitutes an impairment of the human 
dignity of the claimant. 
The claimant who persuades the Court of these three elements is entitled 
to a finding of discrimination, which means that the challenged law is in 
breach of section 15. The burden then shifts to government to justify the 
discriminatory law under section 1. For reasons explained in the article, 
section 1 justification is difficult, because the finding of an impairment 
of human dignity will involve much of the same inquiry as that required 
by section 1. However, in unusual cases, section 1 justification will still 
uphold a discriminatory law. 
 
